Pakistan’s
nuclear umbrella has given the country breathing space to modernise her
military, with a sea-based deterrent on the cards. Islamabad is
pursuing a policy of self-reliance and export promotion in the defence
sector, based on an emerging strategic relationship with Beijing.
by Alex Calvo
The
October 2014 centenary anniversary of the arrival of the first British
Indian troops on the European Western Front during the First World War
is a good moment to examine the current military modernisation plans of
one of the successor states of British India: Pakistan. This is a
country where the armed forces are widely seen by both experts and the
population as the backbone of a still-ongoing process of
nation-building. At the international level, Pakistan remains a state
which is strategically essential to both Beijing and Washington DC. The
existence of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent has provided some breathing
space to confront India without the need for a conventional parity in
terms of materiel and personnel, allowing Islamabad to focus on military
modernisation and internal security. Her nuclear force also widens the
scope to wage or at least tolerate sub-conventional and limited
conventional warfare against India, including the use of proxy actors
such as armed militants in the disputed region of Kashmir without fear
of escalation.
In addition to infiltration in Kashmir, incidents
blamed on proxy Pakistan actors in recent years include the 26 November
2008 seaborne attack against Mumbai and the 23 May 2014 strike against
the Indian Consulate in Herat, western Afghanistan. Domestically, the
Pakistan military has managed to develop a strong esprit de corps,
seeing itself as more advanced and modern than the country’s surrounding
society and its politicians. It has also become a meritocratic avenue
for social advancement. While fears of Islamist infiltration into
Pakistan’s armed forces persist, most officers are considered to be
Pakistani nationalists; loyal to Pakistan as nation-state rather than
the Ummah, Islam’s universal community of believers.
Pakistan has
to contend with three strategic imperatives: bringing together a diverse
population in terms of language, ethnicity and economic interests,
confronting India, and preventing the emergence of a unified, hostile
Afghanistan. Reza Fazli, a Kabul-based researcher at the United Nations
Non-Governmental Organisation Liaison Office, active in research and
peace-building, who follows regional dynamics, believes that Pakistan is
“an expansionist state bent on destroying, occupying or at least
weakening Afghanistan”, while pointing out that “it is the Pakistani
military that sets the tone of Pakistani foreign policy, particularly
with regards to Afghanistan (and India)”. Islamabad’s motivations to try
to weaken Afghanistan include avoiding encirclement and the emergence
of a unified Pashtunistan, an area of land encompassing parts of
Afghanistan and Pakistan inhabited by the Pashtun ethnic group. In
addition to these concerns, a fourth preoccupation of Pakistan is
maritime security while the country remains one of the largest
contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations.
In defence
industrial terms, Islamabad can be expected to continue her drive for
self-reliance partly prompted by past United States sanctions against
her nuclear weapons programme, diversification, and a push for exports,
with China as the Pakistan government’s preferred partner. Saudi Arabia
is one of Pakistan’s most significant clients, with some observers
concerned that Islamabad may enable Riyadh to acquire a nuclear
deterrent through the export of know-how to this end.
Conventional Land Forces
Traditionally
the senior service, Pakistan’s Army has a strength of more than 600,000
(1,400,000 adding reserves and paramilitary forces), it fields more
than 2500 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and 4000 armoured personnel carriers
and other armoured vehicles, and its artillery is believed to comprise
more than 3000 towed guns and almost 500 self-propelled pieces, as well
as different types of anti-tank guided missiles, including the AQ Khan
Research Laboratories Bakhtar-Shikan, and 92 multiple launch rocket
systems. The MBT inventory include more than 300 (600 planned) Heavy
Industries Taxila Al-Khalid MBTs which is closely based upon the
Russian/Soviet Kharkiv Morozov T-54, plus 320 Kharkiv Morozov T-80 MBTs,
320 Heavy Industries Taxila Al-Zarrar T-59s along with Norinco Type
85-II and Type 69-II MBTs, as well as 345-450 General Dynamics Land
Systems M48A5 and 50 Kharkiv Morozov T-54/55 MBTs. The armoured vehicle
inventory includes 2000 domestic-developed amphibious Heavy Industries
Taxila Talha and Saad armoured personnel carriers, 300 BAE Systems M2
Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and more than 1600 Food Machinery
Corporation/BAE Systems M113 armoured personnel carriers.
Auxiliary Forces
A
significant portion of Pakistan has never been fully brought under the
control of the central government, including the FATA
(Federally-Administered Tribal Areas), located in the north west of the
country. Rather than civilian police and conventional army units, a
number of militia and constabulary-type forces constitute Islamabad’s
most visible face in those regions, leaving the army free to face India.
To this end, the Frontier Corps are recruited from the Pashtun
population near the Afghan border. Created by the British, it is
separate from the army and sometimes works with irregular village
forces. The Frontier Corps are joined by the Laskhars, a part-time
tribal militia made up of civilians available to take up weapons.
Lightly armed, they on the other hand know the physical and human
terrain in the areas where they operate. Paramilitary police forces in
the FATA include the Levies, armed with weapons provided by the
authorities (the Laskhars use their own) and more formal training
compared to the Lashkars.
Navy
A
junior service in comparison to the army, it is nevertheless tasked with
key roles such as coastal protection and the defence of Sea Lines Of
Communication (SLOCs). It operates eleven frigates and destroyers
(including six ‘Amazon’ class frigates and one ‘Leander’ class frigate
in a training role), three ‘Eridan’ class Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
vessels, four ‘Jalalat’ class fast attack craft, and eight auxiliary
ships, plus oilers and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). The subsurface
fleet includes five French-made ‘Khalid’ class conventional
hunter-killer (SSKs) boats purchased in the 1990s and two ‘Hashmat’
class SSKs which were bought in the 1970s, plus three midget submarines.
Pakistan’s
naval aviation comprises four Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA), eight Fokker F27-200 MPA, and three Dassault
Breguet Atlantique ATL-I MPA. The naval support helicopter fleet
includes six AgustaWestland Sea King Mk.45 rotorcraft and twelve Hafei
Z-9EC aircraft, among others. Weapons used by the Pakistan Navy include
China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) C-602 anti-ship
cruise missiles, purchased from China and with an estimated speed of
529 knots (980 kilometres-per-hour) and range of 151 nautical miles (280
kilometres). In addition, the Pakistan Air Force operates a specialised
anti-ship squadron equipped with Dassault Mirage V strike aircraft. The
personnel strength of the navy includes more than 22000 active and 5000
reserve officers and sailors.
Traditionally, the port of Karachi
has been the home of the Pakistani Navy. A crowded harbour, in a city
sometimes described as ‘feral’, it experienced an attack on the Mehran
Naval Air Base there in 2011, when Pakistani Taliban cadres destroyed
two Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion patrol aircraft. John P. Sullivan, a
senior research fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies on Terrorism
(CAST), explains that “a feral city has lost the ability to moderate
gangs, crime and violence. The rule of law is replaced by impunity for
criminal conflict and a lack of state solvency (legitimacy plus
capacity). The absence of the state is reinforced by the primacy of the
illicit economy”. Mr. Sullivan adds that “Karachi fits this model”.
Gradually, the Navy is diversifying into other bases, such as PNS
Siddique in Turbat, in the south-west, near the strategic deepwater port
of Gwadar and border with Iran, designed to host some naval air assets.
Another base is Pasni, where the P-3Cs are located. In April 2014
Pakistan shifted the bulk of her operational fleet (submarines included)
from Karachi to Jinnah Naval Base, also located in the south-west of
the country.
Pakistan’s navy is planning to expand and modernise.
Current procurement initiatives include four more ‘Zulfiqar’ class
frigates. The first three were built in China and the fourth in
Pakistan. The ‘Zulfiquar’ class displaces 3000 tons and carries CASIC
C-802A long-range anti-ship and China Academy of Defence Technology
FM-90 surface-to-air missiles, depth charges, torpedoes, a 76mm gun and a
close-in-weapons system, while embarking a Hafei Z-9EC naval support
helicopter. Also four modern corvettes are to be built at the Karachi
Shipyard and Engineering Works, at an unspecified date, and Pakistan has
requested the purchase of six ‘Oliver Hazard Perry’ class frigates from
the US, however US Congressional hostility which may prevent the deal.
Candidate corvettes to meet Pakistan’s requirements include DCNS’
‘Gowind’ class, ThyssenKruppMarineSystems ‘MEKO A-100/D’ class or
Istanbul Naval Shipyard’s ‘Ada’ class. Naval procurement plans also
cover additional oilers, MCMs and OPVs.
In order to replace her
‘Daphne’ class SSKs, decommissioned in 2006, there are reports that the
Pakistani Navy is negotiating the purchase of DCNS ‘Marlin’ or
Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH ‘Type-214’ class submarines. Other
reports point out that China may have offered to sell six ‘Yuan’ class
SSKs. Sino-Pakistani cooperation in naval construction is not only
further proof of the strong bilateral relationship and move away from US
procurement by Pakistan, but is also geared towards exports to third
countries and shows that Islamabad, like Beijing, is enhancing its
maritime power.
Air Force
Pakistan’s
air force operates some 800 aircraft from seven air bases, and its
personnel numbers 65000 (with around 3000 pilots). Its front line
strength remains focused on the General Dynamics/Lockheed Martin
F-16A/B/C/D Block-10/15/50/52 multi-role combat aircraft, with Islamabad
buying a further 13 from Jordan in 2014, bringing her total to 76. In
September 2014 the last of 41 F-16A/Bs to be modernised by Turkish
Aerospace Industries (TAI) were delivered back to the air force
following both structural and avionics upgrades (see ‘Pakistan receives
upgraded F-16s from Turkey’ news story in this issue). However the
Chenghu/Päkistan Aeronautical Complex JF-17 Thunder MRCA, co-produced
with China, is currently the air force’s first priority and is one of
the best examples of Pakistan’s gradual shift towards Beijing. In
December 2013 production of 50 JF-17 Block-II MRCA began, with improved
avionics and weapons load, as well as an in-flight refuelling
capability. Plans call for the purchase up to 250 planes, replacing the
Chengdu F-7 and Dassault Mirage-III/V MRCA. Beijing and Islamabad are
working on a two-seater variant of the JF-17 for use as a trainer or for
night strike missions expected to be designated as the JF-17 Block-III.
Furthermore, there has been much speculation about the possible
purchase of Chengdhu J-10 MRCA, considered to be roughly equivalent to
the US F-16C/D Block-50/52 MRCA.
Pakistan’s main aircraft
manufacturing and maintenance centre is the state-owned Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC) in Kamra (Punjab). Considered to be the
world’s third largest assembly plant, it was originally built to service
Chinese-made aircraft. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
manufacturers include the privately-owned Karachi-based Integrated
Dynamics (ID) and government-owned PAC, the latter producing the Uqaab
UAV. While observers point out that current UAVs have not been
weaponised, some have pointed out that the Uqaab may be weaponised with
Chinese assistance in the future.
Nuclear Forces
Given
Pakistan’s smaller population and economy, compared to India’s, her
nuclear arsenal (estimated at 100-120 warheads) remains a cornerstone of
her defence posture. The programme owes much to Chinese assistance and
is widely considered to have resulted in proliferation assistance to
third parties, through the same networks set up to procure key
materials, and benefiting Libya, Iran, and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). It enjoys popular and military support and
seems to have made it easier for Pakistan to engage in asymmetrical war
against India involving proxies (see above). In addition, Islamabad has
never ruled out a first strike in any future nuclear confrontation.
Pakistan
nuclear delivery systems include the F-16A/B (see above) carrying
nuclear gravity bombs. Other delivery systems include the 173 nautical
mile (320 kilometre) range National Defence Complex (NDC) Ghaznavi and
486nm (900km) range Shaheen short-range tactical ballistic missiles,
with two more in development: the NDC Abdali and Nasr, the latter with
an estimated range of 32nm (60km), plus the intermediate-range Khan
Research Laboratories Ghauri-2 and 1349nm (2500km) range Shaheen-2. The
Ghauri-2 is based on the DPRK’s Nodong intermediate-range ballistic
missile which is believed to be road-mobile and liquid-fuelled, with a
single stage and a range of some 1079nm (2000km). The Shaheen-2 is
solid-fuelled with a similar range. To this we must add two cruise
missiles in development, the air-launched Air Weapons Complex Ra’ad with
a 189nm (350km) range and the ground-launched NDC Babur, the latter of
which has a range of some 348nm (644km). It is rumoured that a naval
version of the latter is also under development. Meanwhile, Pakistan is
working on the Taimur intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of
3777nm (7000km).
Some observers consider Pakistan to have the
fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world, which the country is
modernising. This may be connected to doctrinal developments giving
nuclear weapons a wider role. Islamabad may be working to develop a
sea-based deterrent, giving her a second-strike capability. Mandeep
Singh, associate editor at specialised defence website Orbat believes
that this would “change the strategic balance completely” and
“significantly enhance the chances of nuclear war”. Mr. Singh says that
“Pakistan now has extremely competent security in place for its nuclear
weapons”, although the possibility of the weapons (falling under the
unauthorised possession of violent Islamist organisations) can’t be
ruled out given recent experience”. He deems it credible that Saudi
Arabia, “in an extremely difficult strategic position”, may purchase
nuclear technology or hardware from Pakistan.
Conclusions
Pakistan
is modernising key weapons systems, often in partnership with China,
and gearing them also towards exports. In terms of nuclear weapons the
two big questions are whether Islamabad may deploy a sea-based
deterrent, thus completing its triad, and whether Saudi Arabia may
obtain a nuclear deterrent with technological support from Pakistan. In
the conventional arena, the continued development and possible export of
the JF-17 MRCA, co-produced with China, merits careful attention, as
does the progress in domestic-made UAVs. The renewal of Pakistan’s
submarine fleet could also significantly contribute to the country’s
military strength.
Credit
asianmilitaryreview.com
Associated Press
